

Valenced Experience and the Epistemology of Value

Declan Smithies

Some experiences are positively or negatively valenced just in virtue of how they feel. Consider, for example, the phenomenal contrast between feelings of pleasure and displeasure, feelings of attractive and aversive desire, or feelings of positive and negative emotion. This paper is concerned with a question about the epistemological significance of valenced experience. What role does it play in justifying our beliefs about value?

On the *perceptual model*, valenced experience justifies beliefs about value in much the same way that perceptual experience justifies beliefs about perceptible properties, such as color, shape, and motion. Many epistemologists agree that perceptual experience plays a foundational epistemic role in justifying beliefs about the external world without needing any further justification. The perceptual model maintains that valenced experience plays the same kind of foundational epistemic role in justifying beliefs about value.

The perceptual model seems plausible in many cases: for example, the valenced feeling of aversion towards the pain in your foot justifies believing that this painful condition is bad for you without needing any further justification itself. In other cases, however, the perceptual model seems problematic: for example, merely feeling afraid of a dog that you know to be harmless cannot justify believing that it is dangerous, since your fear of the dog is unjustified. If the perceptual model is right in some cases, though, then why isn't it right in all cases?

There is a *puzzling asymmetry* here that any adequate epistemology of value must explain. Why do some valenced experiences justify beliefs about value without needing any further justification, while others need to be justified in the same way as beliefs about value? We cannot solve this puzzle by simply restricting the perceptual model, since we need to explain why it applies in some cases, rather than others. Indeed, I argue that the perceptual model cannot explain this puzzling asymmetry in any principled way. Instead, I propose to solve the asymmetry puzzle by combining an *inferential model* of the epistemology of value with independently plausible assumptions about the metaphysics of value. On this view,

valenced experience has metaphysical, rather than epistemological, significance: it plays an important role in the constitution of subjective value.

Here is the plan. After introducing the perceptual model (§1), I present the objection that some valenced experiences cannot justify beliefs about value, since they need to be justified in the same way as evaluative beliefs (§2). Next, I explain how the inferential model solves this problem (§3), and I defend it against the objection that it cannot explain how some valenced experiences can justify belief without needing any justification (§4). Finally, I explain the puzzling asymmetry within the class of valenced experiences by combining the inferential model with plausible assumptions about the metaphysics of value (§5).

1. The Perceptual Model

The perceptual model says that valenced experience justifies beliefs about value in the same way that perceptual experience justifies beliefs about the external world.¹ Needless to say, there is no universal consensus in epistemology about how perceptual experience justifies beliefs about the external world. As a result, the exact commitments of the perceptual model vary depending on which perceptual epistemology is presupposed in the background.

Many epistemologists—myself included—endorse the *phenomenological view* that perceptual experience justifies beliefs about the external world in virtue of its phenomenal character alone.² Since I have defended this view elsewhere, I will simply assume it here. My question is whether it can be extended to account for our justification for beliefs about value. If so, that would be an important result, since it would offer an attractive theoretical framework for unifying the epistemology of value with the epistemology of perception. Unfortunately, however, I will argue that the extension cannot be made plausible.

As I understand it, the phenomenological view of the epistemology of perception comprises five core claims. First, perceptual experience *represents* the external world.

¹ The perceptual model has been applied to emotions (Johnston 2001, Döring 2007, Tappolet 2016), desires (Stampe 1987, Oddie 2005, Tenenbaum 2007) and unpleasant pain (Tye 2008, Bain 2013, Cowan 2017).

² See, for example, Pryor (2000), Huemer (2001), Peacocke (2004), Chudnoff (2013), and Smithies (2019).

Indeed, perceptual experience represents the external world in virtue of its phenomenal character alone. According to representationalism, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience *just is* a way of representing the external world. This explains why there can be no variation in the phenomenal character of perceptual experience without some variation in how it represents the external world.

Second, perceptual experience *justifies believing* propositions about the external world by representing them.³ It is by representing that something is red, for example, that your visual experience justifies believing that it is red. More generally, if your perceptual experience represents that p , then you thereby have some justification to believe that p , which may be defeated by other rebutting or undercutting evidence.

Third, perceptual experience justifies belief *non-inferentially*. When your perceptual experience represents that p , your justification to believe that p does not depend on your justification to believe anything else. Instead, it depends solely on your perceptual experience. You don't need to infer that something is red from the premise that it looks red together with the further premise that appearance is a reliable guide to reality. Instead, your beliefs can be non-inferentially justified on the basis of perceptual experience.

Fourth, perceptual experience blocks the *regress* of justification: it generates justification for belief without needing any further justification. Beliefs cannot block the regress of justification, since they are always justified or unjustified: if they are unjustified, then they cannot generate justification for belief, but if they are justified, then they merely transmit justification from elsewhere. Perceptual experience, in contrast, is neither justified nor unjustified: that is why it needs no justification in order to generate justification. It is an unmoved epistemic mover.

Finally, perceptual experience justifies belief in virtue of its *phenomenal character*. This follows from what came before: if perceptual experience represents the world in virtue

³ Propositions are just ways the world is represented to be, but perceptual experience may represent them in a non-conceptual format that is distinct from how they are conceptualized in belief.

of its phenomenal character, and it justifies belief in virtue of representing the world, then it justifies belief in virtue of its phenomenal character. This explains why belief cannot play the same epistemic role as perceptual experience in blocking the regress of justification. Occurrent beliefs may have their own cognitive phenomenology, but they lack the distinctive kind of perceptual phenomenology—sometimes called *presentational force*—that is required to justify beliefs without needing any further justification.

My goal here is not to argue for this phenomenological view about the epistemology of perception, but instead to consider whether it can provide an illuminating model for the role of valenced experience in the epistemology of value. On the perceptual model, valenced experience justifies beliefs about value in the same way that visual experience justifies beliefs about perceptible properties, such color, shape, and motion. Assuming the phenomenological view about the epistemology of perception, this means extending all five claims to the epistemology of value.

First, valenced experience *represents value*. On this view, what makes an experience positively or negatively valenced is that it represents things as having positive or negative value. Moreover, this representation of value is essential to the phenomenal character of valenced experience. There is a phenomenal contrast, for example, between representing something as pleasant or unpleasant, attractive or aversive, good or bad.

Second, valenced experience *justifies belief* about value by representing value. The valenced feeling of disgust, for example, gives you a justifying reason to believe that something is disgusting by representing that it is disgusting. More generally, when your valenced experience represents that some object *o* has some evaluative feature *F*, you thereby have some defeasible justification to believe that *o* is *F*.

Third, valenced experience justifies evaluative belief *non-inferentially*. When your experience represents that something has value, this gives you some justification to believe that it has value, which doesn't depend on your justification to believe anything else. You don't need to infer that something is disgusting from the premise that it appears so together

with the further premise that appearance is a reliable guide to reality. Instead, your beliefs about value can be non-inferentially justified on the basis of valenced experience.

Fourth, valenced experience blocks the *regress* of justification: it generates justification for beliefs about value without needing any further justification. Evaluative beliefs cannot play this foundational justifying role because they are either justified or unjustified: if they are unjustified, then they cannot generate justification, but if they are justified, then they merely transmit justification from elsewhere. Valenced experience, in contrast, is neither justified nor unjustified. That is why it can generate justification without needing any further justification: it is an unmoved epistemic mover.

Finally, valenced experience justifies belief about value solely in virtue of its *phenomenal character*. Again, this follows from our earlier claims: if valenced experience represents value in virtue of its phenomenal character, and it justifies belief about value by representing value, then it justifies belief about value in virtue of its phenomenal character. This explains why evaluative belief cannot play the same epistemic role as valenced experience in blocking the regress of justification. Occurrent beliefs about value may have their own cognitive phenomenology, but they do not have the right kind of valenced phenomenology to justify beliefs about value without needing any further justification.

The perceptual model, as I understand it, incurs no commitment to the claim that valenced experiences represent value in a way that is literally *perceptual*. After all, we have hedonically valenced emotional reactions to things that we think about or imagine as well as things that we perceive. Instead, the perceptual model claims only that valenced experiences represent value in some *quasi-perceptual* way that enables them to play the same epistemic role as perceptual experience (Döring 2014: 130; Tappolet 2016: 30). This claim has the attraction of unifying the epistemology of value with the epistemology of perception in a way that assigns a central epistemic role to phenomenal experience. As I will now explain, however, the perceptual model confronts a serious problem.

2. A Problem for the Perceptual Model

The main problem for the perceptual model is that valenced experiences—unlike perceptual experiences—can be justified or unjustified depending on whether or not they are based on justifying reasons. Valenced experiences cannot justify beliefs about value when they need to be justified in the same way as evaluative beliefs. This undermines the perceptual model because these valenced experiences cannot generate justification for beliefs about value, rather than merely transmitting justification that has its source elsewhere.

In the literature on emotion, for example, it is widely acknowledged that emotional feelings can be justified or unjustified.⁴ Consider this example from Bennett Helm:

Having recently been bitten by a rabid dog, I come to be afraid of all dogs including Fido. Nonetheless, I know that this fear of Fido is groundless, for even if he wanted to attack me (something I even now doubt very much given his calm, friendly disposition), he would be unable to do so given his age, arthritis, and lack of teeth. Thus, although I know that Fido is in no way dangerous to me, I am still, irrationally, afraid. (2001: 41)

Helm's point is that there is some degree of irrationality in the conflict between belief and recalcitrant emotion: for example, it is somewhat irrational to fear things that you believe are not dangerous. In Helm's example, the irrationality traces to your emotion, rather than your belief, since you know that Fido is harmless: hence, your fear of Fido is irrational and unjustified. In contrast, there is no such irrationality involved in the conflict between belief and recalcitrant perception: it is not remotely irrational to experience the Müller-Lyer illusion, for instance, when you know the lines are equal in length. Unlike your emotional experience, your perceptual experience cannot be irrational or unjustified.

Here are three different options for responding to this objection. The first response is to uphold the analogy between perception and emotion by abandoning the orthodox view that perceptual experiences cannot be irrational or unjustified. Susanna Siegel (2017) has

⁴ In addition to Helm (2001: 41), see also Deonna and Teroni (2012: 92-93) and Brady (2013: 112-113).

argued, for example, that perceptual experiences can be irrational when they are cognitively penetrated by irrational beliefs. What is needed to block the objection, however, is a much stronger claim that perceptual experiences are irrational whenever they are recalcitrant in the sense that they conflict with what you know or have justification to believe. In any case, Siegel's view is incompatible with the phenomenological view about the epistemology of perception that I am assuming here, since it abandons the claim that perceptual experience justifies belief solely in virtue of its phenomenal character. On Siegel's view, in contrast, etiological facts about perceptual experience are relevant to its justifying role.

The second option is to uphold the analogy between perception and emotion by denying that there is any irrationality in cases of recalcitrant emotion. According to Sabine Döring, for example, "recalcitrant emotions are not irrational" (2014: 124). I am willing to concede that recalcitrant emotions are not as egregiously irrational as inconsistent beliefs. Indeed, this point is central to Helm's argument against doxastic theories of emotion, which identify emotions with beliefs about value. His argument against perceptual theories of emotion relies only on the weaker claim that there is some degree of irrationality in the conflict between emotion and belief, whereas there is none in the conflict between perception and belief. To block this argument, Döring needs to maintain that emotion—like perception—cannot be irrational or unjustified at all. And yet this departs quite radically from our ordinary practices of evaluating emotions as not only fitting or unfitting given the evaluative facts, but also as rational or irrational in light of our evidence about them. It is therefore a highly revisionary proposal.⁵

The third option attempts to reconcile the perceptual model with Helm's disanalogy between perception and emotion. For example, Christine Tappolet acknowledges that emotions—unlike perceptions—can be justified or unjustified, while maintaining that "this difference does not entail that emotions are deprived of justificatory power" (2016: 39).

⁵ It is beyond the scope of this paper to address specific arguments for the revisionary conclusion that there are no reasons for emotion, but see Maguire (2018), Gubka (2022), and Schulz (2025).

In response, however, Helm's disanalogy is enough to undermine one of the central planks in the perceptual model: namely, that emotional experience plays the same epistemic role as perceptual experience in blocking the regress of justification. Perceptual experience can block the regress only because it is immune from justification: there are no justifying reasons for perceptual experience. In contrast, emotion is not immune from justification, since there are justifying reasons to feel emotion. As a result, emotional experience cannot justify belief about value without needing justification in turn.

Tappolet's suggestion, in effect, is that the justifying role of perceptual experience can be decoupled from its role in blocking the regress of justification. On this view, emotional experience can play the same downstream epistemic role in justifying belief even if it cannot play the same upstream epistemic role in blocking the regress of justification. However, this creates problems with bootstrapping and double counting. Consider your fear of Fido: it is either justified or unjustified depending on whether or not it is based on good enough justifying reasons to feel afraid. But emotions cannot justify themselves. So the perceptual model confronts a dilemma.

If your fear is unjustified, then it cannot justify your belief that Fido is dangerous. Otherwise, we get implausible *bootstrapping*. Someone with no evidence that Fido is dangerous cannot acquire justification to believe that Fido is dangerous merely by feeling afraid of Fido for no good reason. Unjustified emotions cannot justify beliefs any more than justified beliefs can. Therefore, your fear of Fido needs to be justified in the same way as your belief that Fido is dangerous.

If your fear is justified, however, then it must be justified by some other reason, since your fear cannot justify itself. If your fear is justified for some other reason, however, then it cannot generate any new justification for belief, since it merely transmits justification from elsewhere. Otherwise, we get implausible *double counting*. Since your reason to feel afraid is distinct from your fear, you could have this reason to feel afraid without feeling any fear. Moreover, a reason to feel afraid of Fido is also a reason to believe that he is dangerous. But it is implausible that feeling afraid of Fido for this reason gives you any extra reason to believe

that Fido is dangerous in addition to the reason on which your fear is already based. Instead, your fear merely transmits a justifying reason for belief that has its source elsewhere.⁶

Either way, your fear of Fido cannot justify believing that Fido is dangerous, since it needs to be justified in the same way as the belief that he is dangerous. Moreover, the same argument extends to emotional experience more generally:

- (1) Emotional experience is either justified or unjustified depending on whether it is based on justifying reasons.
- (2) If emotional experience is unjustified, then it cannot generate justification for beliefs about value. Otherwise, we get implausible bootstrapping.
- (3) If emotional experience is justified, then it cannot generate justification for beliefs about value, but merely transmits justification from another source. Otherwise, we get implausible double-counting.
- (4) Either way, the perceptual model is false: emotional experience cannot generate justification for beliefs about value.

I conclude that emotional experience cannot generate justification for beliefs about value because it needs to be justified in the same way as evaluative belief.

This argument has important ramifications for the epistemology of value, including moral epistemology. Some philosophers maintain that the experience of moral emotion can justify beliefs about morality in much the same way that perceptual experience justifies beliefs about color, shape, and motion. Consider Gilbert Harman's infamous example:

If you round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it, you do not need to *conclude* that what they are doing is wrong; you do not need to figure anything out; you can *see* that it is wrong. (Harman 1977: 4)

According to the perceptual model, I don't need to infer that the action is wrong, since I can know without inference that it is wrong. More specifically, I can acquire this moral

⁶ Brady (2013: 113-14) makes related points about double-counting in the course of raising a different objection to the perceptual model: namely, that it implies that emotions are self-justifying.

knowledge based on my emotional feeling of moral indignation, which represents in some quasi-perceptual way that the action is wrong. The problem is that we can imagine someone whose corrupt moral sensibility leads him to react to acts of torture by feeling moral admiration, rather than moral indignation. Does this corrupt moral emotion justify believing that the act is morally admirable in the absence of reasons to distrust its reliability? Tappolet's version of the perceptual model seems to imply that it does:

Your belief that x is admirable is justified if: (a) you feel admiration towards x , (b) your belief is based on your admiration, and (c) you have no reason to believe that your admiration is inappropriate. (2016: 170)

And yet it seems deeply implausible that anyone can be justified in believing that an act of torture is morally admirable based solely on a feeling of moral admiration.

A more plausible verdict is that no mere feeling of moral admiration can justify believing that an act of torture is morally admirable because these feelings themselves are unjustified. This is enough to block the problematic result that the morally repugnant belief is justified because unjustified emotions cannot justify beliefs any more than unjustified beliefs can. Moreover, the same point generalizes beyond the moral domain. The mere fact that someone with agoraphobia feels afraid of open spaces, for example, gives them no justifying reason to believe that they are in danger. In general, emotions cannot justify beliefs about value because they need to be justified in the same way as evaluative beliefs. Our next challenge is to explain what justifies emotion.

3. The Inferential Model

This section outlines an alternative epistemology of value—namely, the inferential model—which avoids the main problem for the perceptual model. The perceptual model fails because emotional experiences—unlike perceptual experiences—can be justified or unjustified. But if emotions can be justified, then what justifies them?

I propose that emotions are justified only by evidence of value:

- (1) *The evidential principle*: An emotion is justified only by evidence that its object has the evaluative property that merits that emotion.⁷

Suppose, for example, that danger is what merits fear (D'Arms and Jacobson 2023: 31-9). On this assumption, your fear of Fido is justified only by evidence that he is dangerous. The evidential principle explains why emotions are justified in the same way as corresponding evaluative beliefs. Your fear of Fido, like your belief that he is dangerous, is justified only by evidence that he is dangerous.

Our next question concerns the nature of evidence about value. What is it to have evidence that something has an evaluative property? According to the perceptual model, evidence of value is supplied by valenced experiences, such as emotional feelings, which represent the values in question. To avoid the main problem with the perceptual model, however, we need a different answer. A promising alternative is Kieran Setiya's (2012) *reductive* epistemology of value, which reduces all evidence of value to evidence of non-evaluative properties that realize value:

- (2) *The reductive principle*: Evidence that an object has an evaluative property is reducible to evidence that it has certain non-evaluative properties that would in fact realize having that evaluative property.

Evidence that Fido is dangerous, for example, reduces to evidence that he has non-evaluative properties—including sharp teeth and an aggressive personality—that would in fact suffice to make him dangerous. More generally, evidence that an object *x* has some evaluative property *E* is reducible to evidence that *x* has some non-evaluative property *N*, where being *N* would realize being *E*. As Setiya writes: “Evidence for the proposition that *x* is *N* counts as evidence that *x* is *E* when, in virtue of being *N*, an object is or would be *E*” (2012: 49-50).

We can now derive the following conclusion by combining the evidential principle with the reductive principle:

⁷ Compare Goldie (2004: 98), Deonna and Teroni (2012: 124), and Brady (2013: 113). Not all evidence that an object has some value justifies the emotion merited by that value, since testimonial evidence that a joke is funny needn't justify amusement without exposure to what makes it funny.

- (3) *The combined principle*: An emotion is justified only by evidence that its object has certain non-evaluative properties that would in fact realize having the evaluative property that merits the emotion.⁸

Your fear of Fido is justified, for example, by evidence that he has certain non-evaluative properties—including sharp teeth and an aggressive personality—that would in fact suffice to make him dangerous. In Helm’s example, you violate this condition: your fear of Fido is unjustified because you know that he has non-evaluative properties—including arthritis and lack of teeth—that suffice to make him harmless.

I’ll now argue that this reductive epistemology of value is best implemented as a version of the inferential model.⁹ On this view, your evidence that Fido is dangerous reduces to your evidence that he has certain non-evaluative properties that would in fact suffice to make him dangerous, including sharp teeth and an aggressive personality. As a result, your justification for the evaluative belief that Fido is dangerous depends on your justification for the non-evaluative belief that he has sharp teeth and an aggressive personality. According to the standard definition of inferential justification, however, your justification for a belief is *inferential* when “this justification rests in part on the justification you have for believing other supporting propositions” (Pryor 2000: 532). Hence, your justification for the evaluative belief is inferential because it depends on your justification for the non-evaluative belief.

The inferential model raises many questions, but I must limit myself to addressing only three of them here. First, what is the *form* of the inference? Hume’s Law states that you cannot deduce an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ or, more generally, an evaluative conclusion from wholly non-evaluative premises. On Humean versions of inferentialism, you cannot deduce evaluative conclusions about an object from your knowledge of its non-evaluative features

⁸ Compare Deonna and Teroni: “An emotion is justified if and only if the properties apprehended through the cognitive base for this emotion constitute or would constitute an instance of the evaluative property that features in its correctness conditions” (2012: 101).

⁹ An argument is needed here, since neither Setiya (2012) nor Deonna and Teroni (2012) explicitly endorse the inferential model. Smithies (forthcoming) defends the inferential model in moral epistemology, whereas this paper aims to extend it to knowledge of value beyond the moral domain.

except in combination with a priori knowledge of further premises about how values are realized by non-evaluative features. So, for example, your justification to believe that Fido is dangerous has the logical form of an inference by modus ponens:

- (1) Fido has certain non-evaluative features, including sharp teeth and an aggressive personality.
- (2) Anything with those non-evaluative features is dangerous.
- (3) Therefore, Fido is dangerous.

One limitation of this Humean version of inferentialism is that it cannot explain all our evaluative knowledge, since it presupposes that we already have some a priori knowledge about value. Where does this a priori knowledge come from? Given Hume's Law, a priori knowledge of value cannot have its ultimate source in inference. And yet it is notoriously difficult to explain how a priori knowledge could have any non-inferential source.

More recently, however, a growing contingent of moral epistemologists has called Hume's Law into question.¹⁰ On anti-Humean versions of inferentialism, you can deduce evaluative conclusions about an object from your knowledge of its non-evaluative features without relying on antecedent knowledge of general principles about how values are realized by non-evaluative features. So, for example, your justification to infer that Fido is dangerous may take the following form:

- (1) Fido has certain non-evaluative features, including sharp teeth and an aggressive personality.
- (2) Therefore, Fido is dangerous.

Of course, this argument is not formally valid. But neither is the argument from the premise that something is red to the conclusion that it is colored. And yet we can surely know the conclusion that something is colored by deduction from the known premise that it is red without relying on knowledge of the further premise that anything red is colored. Hence, not every deductively valid argument is formally valid. What distinguishes any deductively

¹⁰ See Zimmerman (2010), Setiya (2012), Sparks (2019), and Smithies (2022, forthcoming).

valid argument from one that is merely inductively strong is the following epistemic property: it is guaranteed to preserve not only truth, but also strength of evidential support. When an argument is deductively valid, your evidential support for its conclusion can be no weaker than your evidential support for the conjunction of its premises.

Admittedly, the evaluative conclusion that Fido is dangerous is not entailed by the non-evaluative premise that he has sharp teeth and an aggressive personality. To know that he is dangerous, you need to know further non-evaluative premises, including the premise that he is not sedated. This non-evaluative knowledge may be complex enough to resist finite expression in language. Crucially, however, you don't need to know any evaluative premise that bridges the logical gap between your non-evaluative knowledge about Fido and your knowledge that he is dangerous. You need to know some non-evaluative premises that entail your evaluative conclusion, but you don't need to know in addition that these premises entail your conclusion. After all, it would be an over-intellectualization to suppose that deductive knowledge requires knowledge of entailment.

One advantage of this anti-Humean version of inferentialism is that it explains how we can acquire a priori knowledge of value by means of suppositional reasoning. If you can know the evaluative conclusion that Fido is dangerous by deduction from the known premise that he has certain non-evaluative properties, then you can deduce the same conclusion when the premise is not known but merely assumed for the sake of argument. Using the rule of conditional proof, you can discharge your assumption and conclude that if your non-evaluative premise is true, then so is your evaluative conclusion. In this way, you can acquire a priori knowledge of value by means of suppositional reasoning.

Second, what is involved in the psychological process of inferring an evaluative conclusion from non-evaluative premises? It is no problem for the inferential model that we may lack any awareness of making an inference, since inference is not always conscious. Instead, your knowledge of a conclusion is based on inference when it depends causally and epistemically in the right way on your knowledge of some premises. Typically, in such cases, you satisfy a *counterfactual test*: if you didn't know the premises, then you wouldn't know

the conclusion (McGrath 2017). This counterfactual test is satisfied in our example: if you didn't know that Fido has sharp teeth and an aggressive personality, then you wouldn't know that he is dangerous. This supports the claim that your evaluative knowledge is inferentially based on your non-evaluative knowledge.

Third, what role does emotional experience play in the psychological process of inferring an evaluative conclusion from non-evaluative premises? The inferential model might appear to deprive emotional experience of any psychological role, since emotions provide no further evidence for evaluative beliefs in addition to the evidence on which they are based. This is what Christopher Peacocke calls the "No Addition Thesis":

The No Addition Thesis: For any emotion which is not irrational its representational content is one that is in principle inferable from other information (or misinformation) possessed by the person who has the emotion. (2004: 258)

If your fear of Fido is unjustified, then it cannot justify your belief that Fido is dangerous. If your fear is justified, however, then it is justified by evidence that Fido has non-evaluative properties that would in fact suffice to make him dangerous. This evidence justifies believing that Fido is dangerous whether or not you respond to it by feeling afraid. Hence, your emotional experience appears to play no role in making your evaluative belief justified. Peacocke makes essentially the same observation:

The No Addition Thesis immediately implies that for any moral emotion that is not irrational we cannot by taking its representational content at face value learn something that we could not in principle have inferred from other information already available to us. (2004: 262)

In practice, however, we don't always do what can in principle be done. In the absence of fear, for example, we may not be disposed to infer that something is dangerous from our knowledge that it has non-evaluative features that in fact suffice to pose danger. Moreover, the onset of fear may be operative in disposing us to draw the inference.

To see how this works, suppose you believe that Fido is dangerous because you feel afraid of him. And suppose you feel afraid of him because you know that he has sharp teeth and an aggressive disposition. In that case, your evaluative belief that Fido is dangerous is inferentially based on your non-evaluative belief that he has sharp teeth and an aggressive disposition through the mediating role of feeling afraid. In this way, your emotions can facilitate inference by mediating between our evaluative and non-evaluative beliefs.

Trusting your emotions is a good heuristic: it reliably yields justified beliefs about value when your emotions are reliably responsive to evidence about value. At the same time, however, following this heuristic is not guaranteed to yield justified beliefs about value because your emotions are not *always* responsive to evidence about value. Moreover, your emotions do not generate justification for beliefs about value but merely transmit justification from the evidence on which they are based. Hence, your emotions cannot justify beliefs about value unless they are justified in much the same way.

In summary, the inferential model need not imply that emotional experience plays no epistemic role in explaining what makes your evaluative beliefs justified. It implies only that emotional experience cannot play the same epistemic role as perceptual experience. Emotional experience cannot provide justifying evidence for beliefs about value in the same way that perceptual experience provides justifying evidence for beliefs about color, shape, and motion. Instead, emotions transmit justification from the evidence on which they are based to the evaluative beliefs they prompt us to form. To put the point in standard jargon, emotions don't supply *propositional justification* for beliefs about value, but they can nevertheless play an important role in making them *doxastically justified*.¹¹

4. A Problem for the Inferential Model

I've argued so far that the inferential model gets the right results in cases that the perceptual model gets wrong. I'll now consider the rejoinder that the inferential model gets the wrong results in cases that the perceptual model gets right. More specifically, it seems plausible

¹¹ Deonna and Teroni (2025) draw a similar distinction in their discussion of the epistemic role of emotion, although they do not situate this within an inferential model of evaluative knowledge.

that an unpleasant feeling of pain can block the regress of epistemic justification in much the same way as perceptual experience: it justifies believing that your pain is bad for you without needing any further justification. The objection is that the perceptual model can explain this intuitive datum, whereas the inferential model cannot.

Before addressing this objection, let me clarify some background assumptions that can serve as common ground in this debate. First, we are talking about *sensory* pain, rather than *emotional* pain: consider, for example, a case when you feel the sensation of pain in your foot, rather than a case where you feel “pained” by hearing some bad news.

Second, we can distinguish the *feeling* of pain from the *pain* that is felt. Pain is a felt condition that is located in some region of the body. Your doctor might ask, “Where is the pain that you’re feeling?” and you might truthfully answer, “The pain is in my foot”. Feelings of pain, in contrast, are perceptual experiences that interoceptively represent those painful bodily conditions. In phantom limb syndrome, for example, it may feel as if there is a pain in your limb when there is no such bodily condition, since your limb has been amputated: this is a case of *misrepresentation*.¹²

Third, in normal cases, the feeling of pain has a *valenced* dimension in addition to its *sensory* dimension. Its sensory dimension consists in representing some part of your body as being *painful*, where painfulness is a sensory quality that distinguishes pains from other unpleasant bodily conditions, including itches and tingles.¹³ At the same time, however, the feeling of pain typically has a valenced dimension, since you feel aversion or displeasure towards the painful bodily condition that is represented by your sensory feeling. You *dislike* the pain in your foot: that is why it feels not only *painful* but also *unpleasant*.

¹² Tye (2008: 35) maintains that the word ‘pain’ is ambiguous, but he acknowledges that one sense of the term refers to bodily conditions, rather than our experiences of them.

¹³ Some reductive physicalists identify the sensory quality of painfulness with bodily damage or disorder, just as they identify colors with reflectance properties, but we need not take any stand here in debates about the metaphysics of sensory qualities.

Fourth, because your pain feels unpleasant, it is always *bad* for you to some extent. Of course, the intrinsic badness of feeling pain may be outweighed by its extrinsic benefits: hence the slogan, “no pain, no gain”. It is bad for you in the sense that it impacts negatively on your welfare and not just your proper functioning as a biological organism. More specifically, pain is bad for you in virtue of how it *feels* and not merely in virtue of its environmental causes or its behavioral consequences.

Fifth, the feeling of pain justifies *believing* that your pain is bad for you. Similarly, the feeling of pain justifies *acting* in ways that you have justification to believe will alleviate your pain. In such cases, you are justified in acting for the reason that your pain is bad for you. Indeed, these justifying roles are intimately connected, since nothing can justify acting for the reason that *p* unless it also justifies believing that *p*.

Finally, the feeling of pain *blocks the regress* of epistemic justification: it justifies believing that your pain is bad for you without needing any further justification. The experience of feeling pain, like the perceptual experience of seeing color or shape, is not the kind of mental state that can be justified or unjustified. It makes no sense to ask someone, “What is your justification for feeling pain in your foot?”

With these assumptions in play, we can ask *how* the feeling of pain blocks the regress of epistemic justification. The perceptual model says that your valenced feeling of aversion towards your pain justifies believing that your pain is bad for you by *representing* that it is bad for you in some *quasi-perceptual* way that needs no further justification.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the inferential model confronts the objection that it cannot explain this datum, since it seems to imply that your valenced feeling of aversion towards your pain must be justified in the same way as your belief that your pain is bad for you: namely, by evidence that your pain has non-evaluative properties that make it bad for you.

¹⁴ Tye (2008), Bain (2013), and Carruthers (2023) defend the claim that the feeling of pain is unpleasant because it represents disvalue, while Cowan (2017) explores the epistemological consequences of this claim.

In reply, however, we can explain how the epistemic regress is blocked by combining an inferential epistemology of your justification to believe that your pain is bad for you with independently plausible metaphysical assumptions about what makes your pain bad for you. More specifically, what makes your pain bad for you is not the sensory quality of being *painful*, but rather your valenced feeling of *aversion* towards its painfulness. We can support this claim by considering people with *pain asymbolia* who experience the sensory quality of painfulness without feeling any aversion towards it.¹⁵ They say things like, “My foot hurts, but it doesn’t feel unpleasant.” Their pain is not bad for them in the same way that our pain is bad for us: it is bad for them in virtue of its environmental causes and behavioral consequences, but it is not bad for them solely in virtue of how it feels.

According to the inferential model, your belief that your pain is bad for you is justified by your evidence of its bad-making properties. What makes your pain bad for you is not the sensory quality of painfulness, however, but your feeling of aversion towards its painfulness. Hence, your belief that your pain is bad for you is justified by your evidence that you feel aversion to your pain. Moreover, your evidence that you feel aversion to your pain is constituted by the very fact that you feel aversion to it. Hence, your justification to believe that your pain is bad for you depends inferentially on your justification to believe that you feel aversion to your pain in something like the following way:

- (1) I feel aversion towards the painful condition of my foot.
- (2) Therefore, the painful condition of my foot is *pro tanto* bad for me.

In this way, the inferential model explains how feeling aversion towards your pain justifies believing that it is bad for you. We needn’t embrace the perceptual model to explain this, since the inferential model generates the same result. The only difference between them concerns whether your justification has an inferential structure.¹⁶

¹⁵ See Grahek (2012). The empirical interpretation of pain asymbolia may be disputed, but it is enough for my purposes that the standard interpretation is coherently conceivable, whether or not it applies in actual cases.

¹⁶ Non-human animals need not form *beliefs* about their own feelings of aversion in order to *act* for reasons provided by those feelings so long as their actions are appropriately responsive to their feelings of aversion.

Moreover, the inferential model explains why feeling aversion to your pain needs no further justification. As we saw in §2, some valenced experiences cannot justify beliefs about value because they need to be justified in the same way as beliefs about value. Your feeling of aversion to your pain, in contrast, cannot be justified in the same way as your belief that it is bad for you. After all, your belief that your pain is bad for you is justified by your feeling of aversion towards your pain. Your feeling of aversion cannot be justified in the same way, since it is not *self-justifying*: it cannot justify itself. Hence, your feeling of aversion to your pain cannot be justified in the same way as your belief that it is bad for you. I conclude that the perceptual model has no advantage over the inferential model in explaining how the feeling of pain blocks the regress of epistemic justification. Since it faces problems of its own, we should abandon the perceptual model in favor of the inferential model.

Abandoning the perceptual model undermines any epistemological motivation for the claim that valenced experience represents value. Moreover, it provides some reason to reject this claim. What makes your pain bad for you—what makes it unpleasant—is the fact that you dislike it: you feel displeasure or aversion towards your pain. Hence, the badness of pain is not an *objective* value that is represented by your feeling of pain and constituted independently of it. On the contrary, the badness of pain is a *subjective* value that is constituted by your negatively valenced reaction to it. Hence, your negatively valenced feeling is not best understood as a representation of some objective value that is constituted independently of your own subjective reactions. Instead, it is better understood as a valenced attitude towards a neutral content, rather than a neutral representational attitude towards a valenced content. Unfortunately, however, the project of further exploring the nature of valenced experience goes well beyond the scope of this paper.¹⁷

¹⁷ Jacobson (2019) argues that painful bodily conditions feel unpleasant or aversive when you have an apparently frustrated aversive desire not to be in them. Instead of explaining pleasure and displeasure in terms of desire, however, we might reverse the direction of explanation by explaining desire as a disposition to feel pleasure or displeasure. I defend this hedonic theory of desire in Smithies (forthcoming).

5. The Asymmetry Puzzle

We now confront a puzzling asymmetry within the class of valenced experiences. Some valenced experiences can justify beliefs about value without needing any justification themselves: for example, the feeling of aversion to the pain in your foot can justify believing that it is bad for you. Meanwhile, other valenced experiences cannot justify beliefs about value because they need to be justified in exactly the same way as those beliefs: for example, your fear cannot justify believing that you are in danger because your fear needs to be justified by evidence of danger in much the same way as your evaluative belief. The challenge that remains is to explain why some valenced experiences need to be justified, while others can justify beliefs about value without needing any justification themselves.

We cannot solve this puzzle by simply restricting the perceptual model to a proper subset of our valenced experiences.¹⁸ This would be theoretically unsatisfying without any principled explanation of why the perceptual model applies only to some valenced experiences, rather than others. And yet the perceptual model doesn't provide the theoretical resources to explain this puzzling asymmetry in any principled way. On the phenomenological version of the perceptual model that I am assuming, valenced experience justifies belief in virtue of its valenced phenomenal character alone. And yet this valenced phenomenal character is the unifying characteristic that all valenced experiences have in common. This makes it especially difficult to explain why only some valenced experiences can justify beliefs about value in virtue of their valenced phenomenal character.

As far as I can see, the only viable option for the perceptual model is to draw a phenomenal contrast between two species of valenced experience: for instance, those that represent value *perceptually* rather than *cognitively*. But while there is a striking phenomenal contrast between the perceptions and cognitions that generate our valenced emotional feelings, it is not so clear that there is any such phenomenal contrast between

¹⁸ Pryor (2000: 538-9) restricts the perceptual model to perceptual experiences with basic contents, but he doesn't claim that perceptual experiences with non-basic contents can be justified or unjustified, so this kind of restriction is not enough to solve the asymmetry puzzle.

those valenced feelings themselves. Seeing a rabid dog in the yard feels different from inferring that there is one, but the fear itself need not feel any different. In any case, this alleged phenomenal contrast cannot explain the epistemic contrast we are considering. Whether you see the dog or merely infer it, your belief that it is dangerous cannot be justified by your fear, since your fear needs to be justified in much the same way.

I propose instead to explain the puzzling asymmetry by combining an inferential model of the epistemology of value with some independently plausible assumptions about the metaphysics of value. More specifically, the metaphysical assumption we need is that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of value. On the one hand, there are *subjective values*, which are constituted by our valenced experiences or our dispositions to have them. On the other hand, there are *objective values*, which are constituted independently of our valenced experiences or our dispositions to have them.¹⁹

The clearest example of subjective value is the badness of pain. What makes your pain bad for you is the fact that you feel aversion to it. If feeling aversion to your pain is what makes it bad for you, however, then the fact that it is bad for you cannot be a justifying reason for you to feel aversion to it. Otherwise, we get the absurd result that feeling aversion to your pain gives you a justifying reason to feel aversion to your pain. Surely, however, your feeling of aversion cannot justify itself.

Notice that we cannot avoid this circularity problem by saying that your feeling of aversion to your pain is justified by *evidence* that it is bad for you, rather than the *fact* that it is bad for you. After all, your evidence that your pain is bad for you is constituted by the very thing that makes it bad for you: namely, the fact that you feel aversion to it. So, once again, we get the absurd result that your feeling of aversion is self-justifying.

¹⁹ This is not the only way of drawing a distinction between subjective and objective value, but it is a useful and familiar one: for example, subjective theories of welfare are distinguished from objective theories depending on whether an individual's welfare is constituted by their desires or other valenced attitudes. On this taxonomy, there can be objective facts about subjective values, including what is good for you.

To avoid the problematic circularity, we must deny that your feeling of aversion to pain is justified in the same way as your belief that it is bad for you: namely, by your evidence that it is bad for you. Instead, we must acknowledge that your feeling of aversion to pain can justify believing that your pain is bad for you without needing any further justification.

We can make similar points about matters of mere taste. Suppose we share an extremely spicy curry that tastes exactly the same to each of us, although you enjoy the spicy taste, whereas I find it unpleasant. It is implausible that our shared sensory experience justifies one of these reactions while impugning the other: neither of us need merit any rational criticism. There is no unique fact of the matter about whether the curry is tasty, since there is not enough objectivity in standards of taste to determine a precise degree of spiciness that is either too much or too little. Instead, the threshold varies from person to person depending on their tastes. All we can say is that the curry tastes good to you because you enjoy it, while it tastes bad to me because I find it unpleasant. Of course, the curry might taste bad to you on some occasion because your tastebuds are contaminated by what you ate beforehand. So, what makes the curry tasty for you is not your enjoyment of the dish on any specific occasion, but your general disposition to enjoy it under suitable conditions. Even so, this is an example of subjective value, which is constituted by your disposition to experience valenced feelings.

Once again, we can explain why our divergent reactions need no justification. Since your disposition to enjoy the curry is what makes it tasty for you, the fact that it is tasty for you cannot be a justifying reason for you to enjoy it. Otherwise, we get the implausible result that your disposition to enjoy the curry gives you a justifying reason to enjoy it. Surely, though, your disposition to enjoy the curry is not self-justifying: it cannot justify its own manifestations.²⁰ Your enjoyment of the curry cannot be justified by the fact that it is tasty for you because this evaluative fact is constituted by your disposition to enjoy the curry. Instead, your enjoyment of the curry justifies believing that it is tasty without needing to be

²⁰ As Kripke (1982) and Quinn (1993) argue in different contexts, a mere disposition to ϕ cannot justify ϕ -ing.

justified in the same way. There are no justifying reasons for valenced feelings of this kind: in cases like this one, there are no objective standards for disputing about taste.

With these examples in mind, we can generalize to other subjective values. All subjective values are constituted by occurrent or dispositional valenced reactions of some individual or group under specific conditions. These valenced reactions constitute evidence for those subjective values. However, these valenced reactions cannot be justified either by the subjective values they constitute or by evidence about them. Otherwise, we get the implausible result that they are self-justifying. Instead, our valenced reactions can justify beliefs about subjective value without needing to be justified in the same way.

To complete the solution, we need to explain why this point about subjective values doesn't apply equally to objective values. Objective values are constituted independently of our valenced experiences and our dispositions to have them. As a result, our valenced experiences can be justified these objective values, or by evidence about them, without any vicious circularity. Our valenced experiences cannot justify beliefs about objective value because they need to be justified in the same way as those evaluative beliefs.

This point is clearest in the case of *moral values*. What makes it wrong to torture cats, for example, is not our disposition to react to such an act of torture by feeling negative moral emotions. What makes the act wrong has more to do with how the cat feels than how anyone else feels: it is wrong to inflict pain on the cat because it feels aversion towards its pain. Our moral beliefs are justified by evidence about objective non-moral facts like these, which realize the moral fact that an action is right or wrong. Our moral emotions cannot justify our beliefs about what is right and wrong, since they need to be justified in the same way as our moral beliefs. As we noted in §2, that explains why no mere feeling of moral admiration can justify believing that an act of torture is morally admirable.

The same point applies to *sentimental values*. On a plausible neo-sentimentalist view, these are values whose nature is to merit certain valenced reactions: to be dangerous, for

example, is to merit fear.²¹ What makes something dangerous is not the mere fact that you or anyone else is disposed to fear it. After all, something could be disposed to elicit fear without meriting this reaction. Fear is unmerited in the absence of danger, and it is unjustified in the absence of evidence of danger. Our valenced feelings of fear cannot justify beliefs about danger because they need to be justified in the same way as those evaluative beliefs: that is, by evidence about the non-evaluative facts that make things dangerous.

This explains why feeling afraid of Fido cannot justify believing that he is dangerous: your fear—just like your belief that you are in danger—needs to be justified by evidence that you are in danger. As the same time, however, the feeling of fear has a hedonic dimension: it feels unpleasant to fear something. That is why feeling afraid can justify believing that the situation is bad for you—it is unpleasant—even when you know that the situation presents no danger. What makes the situation bad for you is the very fact that you feel aversion towards it. As we have seen, this subjective value cannot be a justifying reason for you to feel aversion, since your feeling of aversion cannot justify itself.

We can now see more clearly why the puzzling asymmetry cannot be explained by restricting the perceptual model to some valenced experiences, rather than others. After all, one and the same valenced experience—a hedonically valenced feeling of fear—can justify the belief that a situation is bad for you without thereby justifying the belief that you are in danger. To explain this asymmetry, we need the metaphysical distinction between subjective and objective values. Moreover, this distinction poses a threat to the perceptual model, since it maintains that subjective and objective values are represented by our valenced experiences in the same quasi-perceptual way.²² As a result, the perceptual model fails to explain why valenced experiences can justify beliefs about subjective values, although they cannot justify beliefs about objective values because they need to be justified in the same way as our beliefs about them.

²¹ This view is defended by McDowell (1985), Wiggins (1987), and D’Arms and Jacobson (2023) among others.

²² Those—like Tye (2008), Bain (2013), and Carruthers (2023)—who defend the perceptual model of unpleasant pain typically extend it to other valenced experiences too, including emotions.

6. Conclusions

To explain the puzzling asymmetry, we need to recognize that valenced experiences justify beliefs about value only when they constitute those values:

Your valenced experience *V* justifies believing that object *O* has evaluative feature *E* without needing any justification when and only when *O* has *E* in virtue of the fact that you have *V* or you are disposed to have *V* under suitable conditions.

Valenced experiences can justify beliefs about subjective values because they cannot be justified by those values without vicious circularity. However, they cannot justify beliefs about objective values because they need to be justified by those values.

The perceptual model gives the right results when applied to *subjective* values: because these values are constituted by our valenced experiences, our valenced experiences can justify beliefs about them without any need to be justified by them. It gives the wrong results, however, when applied to *objective* values: since these values are constituted independently of our valenced experiences, our valenced experiences cannot generate justification for beliefs about value, since they need to be justified by those values.

This result is surprising because the perceptual model is explicitly designed to explain our knowledge of objective values. After all, perceptual experience gives us knowledge of objective properties of the external world, including color, shape, and motion. It is often thought that we can explain our knowledge of objective values by extending the perceptual model to the evaluative domain. Christine Tappolet, for example, combines her perceptual epistemology of value with a robust realism about the metaphysics of value, according to which the values represented by our emotions are “fully objective and non-relational or monadic properties, which exist independently of any observers” (2016: 116).

What we have found—somewhat ironically—is that the perceptual model fares better with subjective values than it does with objective values. This is a clear indication that perception is the wrong model for understanding the epistemology of value: it gets the right results in some cases, but not for the right reasons. In this paper, I have explained how an inferential model can give a better and more unified explanation of the epistemology of

subjective and objective values alike. Although much work remains to be done, this paper makes a presumptive case that the inferential model offers a more promising framework than the perceptual model for understanding our knowledge of value.²³

References

- Bain, David. 2013. What makes pains unpleasant? *Philosophical Studies* 166: 69-89.
- Brady, Michael. 2013. *Emotional Insight*. Oxford University Press.
- Carruthers, Peter. 2023. On valence: Imperative or representation of value? *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 74: 533-553.
- Chudnoff, Elijah. 2013. *Intuition*. Oxford University Press.
- Cowan, Robert. 2017. Pain and justified evaluative belief. In *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain*, edited by Jennifer Corns, 510-523.
- D'Arms, Justin, and Jacobson, Daniel. 2023. *Rational Sentimentalism*. Oxford University Press.
- Deonna, Julien, and Teroni, Fabrice. 2012. *The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction*. Routledge.
- Deonna, Julien and Teroni, Fabrice. 2025. Why are emotions epistemically indispensable? *Inquiry* 68: 91-113.
- Döring, Sabine. 2007. Affective perception and rational motivation. *Dialectica* 61: 363-394.
- Döring, Sabine. 2014. Why recalcitrant emotions are not irrational. In *Emotion and Value*, edited by Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd, 124-136. Oxford University Press.
- Goldie, Peter. 2004. Emotion, feeling, and knowledge of the world. In *Thinking about Feeling*, edited by Robert Solomon, 91-106. Oxford University Press.
- Grahek, Nikola. 2012. *Feeling in Pain and Being in Pain, 2nd Edition*. MIT Press.

²³ Earlier versions of this paper were presented from 2024 too 2026 at the OSU Dubrovnik Conference on Emotion and Value, the Jagiellonian Conference on Perception, the Rutgers Epistemology Conference, and colloquium talks at Iowa State, Southampton, Toronto, and Washington St Louis. I am grateful to audiences on all those occasions and especially to Justin D'Arms for comments on a previous draft.

- Gubka, Steven. 2022. There are no irrational emotions. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 103: 293-317.
- Helm, Bennett. 2001. *Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value*. Cambridge University Press.
- Huemer, Michael. 2001. *Skepticism and the Veil of Perception*. Rowman and Littlefield.
- Jacobson, Hilla. 2019. Not only a messenger: Towards an attitudinal-representational theory of pain. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 99: 382-408.
- Johnston, Mark. 2001. The authority of affect. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 53: 181-214.
- Kripke, Saul. 1982. *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. Harvard University Press.
- Maguire, Barry. 2018. There are no reasons for affective attitudes. *Mind* 127: 779-805.
- McDowell, John. 1985. Values and secondary qualities. In *Morality and Objectivity*, edited by Ted Honderich, 110-129. Routledge.
- McGrath, Matthew. 2017. Knowing what things look like. *Philosophical Review* 126: 1-41.
- Oddie, Graham. 2005. *Value, Reality, and Desire*. Oxford University Press.
- Peacocke, Christopher. 2004. *The Realm of Reason*. Oxford University Press.
- Pryor, James. 2000. The skeptic and the dogmatist. *Noûs* 34: 517-549.
- Quinn, Warren. 1993. Putting rationality in its place. In *Morality and Action*, 228-255. Cambridge University Press.
- Schultz, Conner. 2025. Deliberative control and eliminativism about reasons for emotions. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 103: 72-87.
- Setiya, Kieran. 2012. *Knowing Right from Wrong*. Oxford University Press.
- Siegel, Susanna. 2017. *The Rationality of Perception*. Oxford University Press.
- Smithies, Declan. 2019. *The Epistemic Role of Consciousness*. Oxford University Press.
- Smithies, Declan. 2022. Moral knowledge by deduction. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 104: 537-563.
- Smithies, Declan. Forthcoming. A hedonic theory of desire. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*.
- Smithies, Declan. Forthcoming. *Deductive Moral Knowledge*. Oxford University Press.

- Sparks, Jacob. 2019. Is, ought, and the regress argument. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 97: 528-543.
- Stampe, Dennis. 1987. The authority of desire. *Philosophical Review* 96: 335-381.
- Tappolet, Christine. 2016. *Emotions, Values, and Agency*. Oxford University Press.
- Tenenbaum, Sergio. 2007. *Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason*. Cambridge University Press.
- Tye, Michael. 2008. The experience of emotion: an intentionalist theory. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 243: 25-50.
- Wiggins, David. 1987. A Sensible Subjectivism? *Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value*, 185-211. Blackwell.
- Zimmerman, Aaron. 2010. *Moral Epistemology*. Routledge.