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JUAN COMESAÑA

- appointments** Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University, 2022–Present.
Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona, 2018-2022.
Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona, 2009-2018
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2003-2009
- education** Ph.D, Philosophy, Brown University, 2003.
Licenciatura in Filosofía, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1996.
- publications** *Books*
Juan Comesaña. 2020. *Being Rational and Being Right*. Oxford University Press.
Reviews
Mona Simion, *Mind*, forthcoming.
Symposia
John Hawthorne, Mark Schroeder, and Roger White, *Philosophical Studies*, forthcoming.
Bob Beddor and Lisa Cassell, Author meets critics session at the Central APA, 2022.
Agustín Rayo and Eleonora Cresto, [Philosopher meets critics session](#) organized by the CONCEPT group of the University of Cologne.
Juan Comesaña and Manuel Comesaña, 2022. *Skepticism: The Basics*. Routledge, forthcoming in April 2022.
- Journal articles*
"Precis of *Being Rational and Being Right*", *Philosophical Studies*, forthcoming.
"Replies to Hawthorne, Schroeder, and White", *Philosophical Studies*, forthcoming.
Symposium on Scott Sturgeon's *The Rational Mind*, *Philosophical Studies*, forthcoming.
"Practical Reasons for Beliefs and Dilemmas for Evidentialism" (with Matt McGrath), forthcoming in Hughes (ed.), *Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas*, Oxford University Press.
"Rationality and Truth" (With Stew Cohen), forthcoming in Dutant and Littlejohn (eds.), *The New Evil Demon*, Oxford University Press.

- “Conocimiento, justificación y clausura en la epistemología de Sosa” (with Timothy Kearl), Modesto Gómez-Alonzo and David Pérez Chico (eds.), *Ernesto Sosa: conocimiento y virtud*, Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza (2021).
- “An Appraisal of the Evolution of Some of the Main Themes in Sosa’s Epistemology”, *Trans/Form/Acao*, v. 44, pp. 29-42 (2021).
- “Rigidity, Symmetry and Defeasibility”, *Philosophical Issues* 30 (1) (2020), pp. 54-70.
- “A Plea for Falsehoods”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 1, Issue 2 (2020), pp. 247-276.
- “Skepticism” (with Peter Klein), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/skepticism/>.
- “Escepticismo”, *Enciclopedia de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica* (2019) (URL: <http://www.sefaweb.es/escepticismo/>).
- “Empirical Justification and Defeasibility”, *Synthese* 198 (2018), pp. 1771-86.
- “A Note on Knowledge-First Decision Theory and Practical Adequacy”, Brian Kim and Matthew McGrath (eds.), *Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology* (2018), Routledge.
- “Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?”, Kevin McKain (ed.), *Believing in Accordance with the Evidence* (2018), Springer.
- “Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?” (with Eyal Tal), *Noûs* 51, 1 (2017), pp. 95-112.
- “On Sharon and Spectre’s Argument Against Closure”, in *Philosophical Studies* 174, 4 (2017), pp. 1039-46.
- “Perceptual Reasons” (with Matthew McGrath), *Philosophical Studies* 173, 4 (2016), pp. 991-1006.
- “Easy Knowledge Makes No Difference: Reply to Wielenberg” (with Carolina Sartorio), *Logos and Episteme* 6, 2 (2015).
- “Falsehood and Entailment”, *Philosophical Perspectives* 29, 1 (2015), pp. 82-94.
- “Normative Requirements and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations”, *The Journal of Philosophy* 112, 11 (2015), pp. 600-26.
- “Can We Believe for Practical Reasons?”, *Philosophical Issues* 25, 1 (2015), pp. 189-207.
- “Evidence of Evidence is Evidence (trivially)” (with Eyal Tal), *Analysis* 75, 4 (2015), pp. 557-9.
- “Defeasibility Without Inductivism”, Abrol Fairweather (ed.), *Virtue Epistemology Naturalized* (2014), Springer.
- “Having False Reasons” (with Matthew McGrath), Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri (eds.), *Epistemic Norms* (2014), Oxford University Press.

- “Difference-Making in Epistemology” (with Carolina Sartorio), *Noûs* 48, 2 (2014), pp. 368-87.
- “There is no Immediate Justification”, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup and John Turri (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, 2nd. edition (2014), Blackwell.
- “Reply to Pryor”, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup and John Turri (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, 2nd. edition (2014), Blackwell.
- “Sosa on Safety and Epistemic Frankfurt Cases”, John Turri (ed.), *Virtuous Thoughts: Essays on the Philosophy of Ernest Sosa* (2013), Springer.
- “Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a Reply” (with Stewart Cohen), *Inquiry* 56, 4 (2013), pp. 400-15.
- “Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic” (with Stewart Cohen), *Inquiry* 56, 1 (2013), pp. 15-29.
- “Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation”, *Res Philosophica* 90, 2 (2013), pp. 237-60.
- “On A Puzzle About Withholding”, *Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 63, Issue 251 (2013), pp. 374-6.
- “Conciliation and Peer-Demotion in the Epistemology of Disagreement”, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 49, N. 3 (2012), pp. 237-52.
- “Can Contemporary Semantics Help the Skeptic get a Life?”, Diego Machuca (ed.), *Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy*, Springer, 2011.
- “Conservatism, Preservationism, Conservationism and Mentalism”, *Analysis* (2011) 71 (3): 489-92.
- “Evidentialist Reliabilism”, *Noûs* 44:4 (2010), 571-600. Reprinted in Ram Neta (ed.), *Epistemology*, Routledge (2012).
- “Reliabilism”, Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Epistemology*, Routledge (2010).
- “Is Evidence Knowledge?” (with Holly Kantin), *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. LXXX, N. 2 (2010), pp. 447-454.
- “What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism?”, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 90, N. 1 (2009), pp. 1-20.
- “Comments on Carl Ginet’s ‘Self-Evidence’”, *Veritas* 54, 2 (2009), pp. 41-7.
- “Seguridad y sueños en la epistemología de Sosa”, *Teorema* 28, 1 (2009), pp. 75-81.
- “Could There Be Exactly Two Things?”, *Synthese* Vol. 162, N. 1 (2008), 31-35.
- “Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals”, *Philosophy Compass* 2 (6) (2007), 781-791.

- "A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem", *Philosophical Studies* Vol. 129:1 (2006), 27-47.
- "Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* LXXI (2005), 367-383.
- "We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now", *Philosophical Perspectives* 19 (2005), 59-76.
- "The Pyrrhonian Problematic", *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Macmillian, second edition (2005).
- "Unsafe Knowledge", *Synthese* Vol. 146:3 (2005), 393-402.
- "The Diagonal and the Demon", *Philosophical Studies* 102 (2002), 249-266.

Reviews

- Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), *Pyrrhonian Skepticism*. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, June 2005.
- Stephen Hetherington (ed.), *Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays*. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, May 2007.
- Jonathan Sutton, Without Justification, *Mind* Vol. 118, N. 471 (2009), pp. 878-882.

Invited talks

- Précis of *Being Rational and Being Right* and replies to critics, Central Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, 2022
- "Revisiting the argument from illusion", Rutgers University, Spring 2022.
- "Revisiting the argument from illusion", Arizona State University, Fall 2021.
- "Revisiting the argument from illusion", Cornell University, Fall 2021.
- "Revisiting the argument from illusion", COGITO, University of Glasgow work in progress group, Fall 2021.
- "Revisiting the argument from illusion", Orange Beach Epistemology Conference, Fall 2021.
- "Being Rational and Being Right", Sociedad Peruana de Investigación Filosóficas, Summer 2021.
- "Rigidity, Defeasibility and Symmetry", Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 2019.
- "Being Rational and Being Right", July 2018, Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico.
- "A Plea for Falsehoods", May 2017, Rutgers Epistemology Conference.
- "Experience and Defeasible Justification", June 2017, Australian National University Departmental Colloquium.
- "Experience and Defeasible Justification", July 2017, Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico.

- “Falsehood and Entailment”, March 2016. Southwest Epistemology Workshop.
- “Belief and Action: Rationality and Falsehood”, June 2016, Keynote speaker, Congreso de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica, Oviedo, Spain.
- “Justification, Excuses and Rationality”, June 2016, Institute Jean Nicod, Paris, France.
- Symposium on Ernest Sosa’s *Agency and Normativity*, July 2015, Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico.
- “Modus Ponens and Dynamic Modus Ponens”, July 2015. Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico.
- “Can we Believe for Practical Reasons”, January 2015, SOFIA XX Conference, Huatulco, Mexico.
- “Normative Requirements and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations”, October 2014. University of Iowa.
- “Against the new infallibilists”, November 2014. Federal University of Bahia.
- “Against the new infallibilists”, June 2014. University of St. Andrews.
- “What Negation Problem for Expressivism?”, June 2014. Institute Jean Nicod.
- “Perceptual Evidence”, March 2014. Rutgers University, Camdem.
- “Safety in Numbers?”, October 2013. University of Bonn.
- “Normative Requirements and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations”, January 2013. Arizona State University.
- “Neo-Rationalism and the Doxastic Problem of Easy Knowledge”, June 2012. Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Argentina.
- “Neo-Rationalism and the Doxastic Problem of Easy Knowledge”, May 2012. Conference on Epistemology. Norway.
- “Neo-Rationalism and the Doxastic Problem of Easy Knowledge”, April 2012 University of Geneva.
- “Difference-Making in Epistemology” (with Carolina Sartorio), June 2012. UNAM. Mexico.
- “Difference-Making in Epistemology” (with Carolina Sartorio), June 2011. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Argentina.
- “Defeasibility Without Inductivism”, November 2011. Universidad de Barcelona.
- “Defeasibility Without Inductivism”, May 2011. Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop.
- “Can We Believe For Practical Reasons?”, Sept. 2010. University of Arizona.
- “Epistemic and Practical Justification”, July 2010. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Argentina.
- “Reasons Without Knowledge”, May 2010. Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop.
- “From the Armchair: A Defense of Traditional Philosophical Methodology”, July 2009. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Argentina.

- “Proportional Weight and Total Evidence in the Epistemology of Disagreement”, June 2009. Conference on Epistemic Virtue and Value. Bled, Slovenia.
- “Proportional Weight and Total Evidence in the Epistemology of Disagreement”, July 2008. Universidad Torcuato DiTella. Buenos Aires, Argentina.
- “Proportional Weight and Total Evidence in the Epistemology of Disagreement”, April 2009. Wooster College.
- “Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation”, July 2008. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Argentina.
- “Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation”, October 2008. Midwest Epistemology Workshop.
- “Neo-Pyrrhonism, Contrastivism and Normativity”, June 2008. NYU La Pietra Conference on Skepticism: Ancient, Modern, Contemporary. Italy.
- “Neo-Pyrrhonism, Contrastivism and Normativity”, July 2008. International Conference on Ancient Pyrrhonism and its Influence on Modern and Contemporary Philosophy. Buenos Aires, Argentina.
- “Pragmatic Encroachment: All Or Nothing At All”, October 2007. University of Arizona.
- “Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals”, May 2007. Second Online Philosophy Conference: http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/2nd_annual_online_philoso/2007/05/juan_comesana.html
- “Epistemic Justification”, July 2006. Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Argentina.
- “Evidentialist Reliabilism”, December 2005. University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee.
- “A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem”, December 2004. University of Texas, Austin.
- “Externalism and Internalism in Epistemology: A Reconciliation, But Not The One You Are Thinking of”, December 2002. SUNY Buffalo.
- “Externalism and Internalism in Epistemology: A Reconciliation, But Not The One You Are Thinking of”, December 2002. University of Missouri, Columbia.
- “Externalism and Internalism in Epistemology: A Reconciliation, But Not The One You Are Thinking of”, January 2003. University of Vermont.
- “Externalism and Internalism in Epistemology: A Reconciliation, But Not The One You Are Thinking of”, January 2003. University of Wisconsin, Madison.
- “Epistemic Internalisms and Externalisms: Another Reconciliation”, July 2002. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Argentina.
- “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Humean, Kantian, and Hobbesian Conceptions of the Relation Between Rationality and Morality”, December 2001. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Argentina.
- “The Diagonal and the Demon”, August 2001. XIX International Philosophy Conference: Skepticism, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, México.

other
conferences

Returning participant at the Rutgers Epistemology Conference. May 2009. New Brunswick, New Jersey.

“Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation”, April 2009. Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. Canada.

Comments on Richard Feldman, “What is the Internalism/Externalism Debate About”, May 2008. Wisconsin Epistemology Conference. Madison, Wisconsin.

Comments on Michael Rescorla, “The Dialectical Regress of Justifications”, April 2008. American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting. Chicago, Illinois.

“Reliability and Probability”, May 2007. APA Pacific Division Meeting.

“Neo-Pyrrhonism, Contrastivism and Normativity”, April 2007. APA Central Division Meeting.

“A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem”, August 2004. Fifth Annual Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference.

“Unsafe Knowledge”, April 2004. APA Pacific Division Meeting.

Comments on Ted Sider, “Monism and Statespace Structure”, January 2008. Arizona Ontology Conference. Tucson, Arizona.

Comments on Carl Ginet’s “Self-Evidence”, June 2007, The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, PUCRS, Porto Alegre, Brazil.

Comments on Mark Moffett’s “The Epistemic Demands of Stability”, August 2007. Eight Annual Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference. Bellingham, Washington.

Discussant-at-large, May 2005. Rutgers Epistemology Conference. Rutgers University.

Comments on Ernest Sosa’s “Intuitions”, May 2004. SOFIA XV. Porto Alegre, Brazil.

Comments on Jennifer Lackey’s “Memory as a Generative Belief-Source”, August 2003. Fourth Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference. Bellingham, Washington.

grants
& awards

Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities (Human Abilities project), Berlin, summers of 2021 and 2022. Postponed until 2022 due to COVID.

Visiting Fellow at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, summers of 2016 and 2017.

Vilas Associate Award, Graduate School, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2008-2010.

Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Summer Grant, summers of 2003-2006.

selected
service

Associate Editor, Theorema, 2012-present.

Section Editor, Ergo, 2013-present.

Advisory boards: SADAF (Argentinian Society for Analytic Philosophy), CON-
ICET (Argentina), Social Philosophy and Policy.